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INDIANA LEGISLATION-1947
Driver Regulations-Chapter 159 creates a Division of Safe-
ty Responsibility and Driver Improvement in the Bureau
of Motor Vehicles.17 It provides for automatic suspension of
drivers' licenses where drivers fail to show financial respon-
sibility, as required by the Act, within sixty days following
an accident resulting in death, personal injury, or property
damage exceeding fifty dollars.19 The previous Act required
the Commissioner of Public Safety to take affirmative action
to suspend the driver's license in cases where the property
damage exceeded twenty-five dollars. Driving while intoxi-
cated is no longer considered an offense for which a driver's
license may be revoked without notice or hearing.20 How-
ever, the Act contains mandatory provisions that a court
convicting a person for such offense shall recommend that
his license be suspended. 21  The suspension of a driver's
license when his judgment debt arising from an auto acci-
dent has remained unsatisfied for thirty days is continued.22
The new Act increases the minimum judgment debt from
twenty-five to fifty dollars. 23
OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION
Chapter 277 creates an Oil and Gas Division within the
Department of Conservation. The Act requires persons who
drill oil and gas wells or persons who have the custody and
control of the land upon which the well is sought to be drilled
to first secure permits from the Depirtment., Permits ex-
pire one year from the date of issuance unless previously
"acted upon." 2 The Department has authority to require an
applicant for a permit to file a bond not exceeding one thou-
sand dollars for each well, to provide for compliance with the
Act.3 The Attorney General may sue to restrain continuing
17. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 159, § 46 specifically repealed Ind. Acts 1943,
c. 175 as amended by Ind. Acts 1945, c. 355.
18. Ind. Acts 1943, c. 175, § 4 as amended Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns,
Supp. 1945) § 47-1047.
19. Id. § 4(h).
20. Id. § 5(b).
21. Id. § 9.
22. Id. § 6(a).
23. Id. § 6(b).
1. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 277, § 19.
2. Id. § 20.
3. Id. § 18.
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violation of the Act.' The penalty section provides for a fine
not exceeding fifty dollars for each day of violation.'
The two sections of special interest are Sections 13 and
13-A. These empower the Department of Conservation to
establish such drilling units as it finds reasonable and prac-
tical, except as limited by Section 9 (c).6 Units may be es-
tablished for the following three purposes-: 1. For the pre-
vention of waste; 2. To prevent the dissipation of natural
resources; and 3. To avoid augmentation and accumulation
of risk arising from the drilling of an excessive number of
wells.7 Two or more adjoining land owners may voluntarily
agree to form a drilling unit,8 but if they fail to do so, the
Department of Conservation has a duty to establish a unit
where the statutory reasons exist., There is no authority to
limit the production from any given well.1o If drilling units
are established, the owners of the component tracts must be
afforded the opportunity to recover their just and equitable
share of oil and gas in the common pool."
Ignorance of scientific facts about oil and gas led an
early Pennsylvania court12 to lay down the "Rule of Capture,"
which became the accepted common law rule. It was believed
that oil flowed as freely as subterranean waters. Oil pools
are capped by gas domes. Water lies below the oil. The
gas pressure is valuable in forcing out the oil.' 3 Unregulated
4. Id. § 24.
5. Id. § 25.
6. No spacing regulation may require allocation of more than twenty
acres of surface area to an individual well for oil production from
a limestone horizon, or more than ten acres from a sandstone
horizon.
7. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 277, § 13.
8. Id. § 13-A(a).
9. Ibid.
10. Id. § 13-A(c).
11. Ibid.
12. Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. De Witt, 130 Pa.
235, 18 A. 724 (1889). The Court said: "They (oil and gas)
belong to the owner of the land and are part of it, so long as they
are on or in it, and are subject to his control; but when they
escape, and go into other land, or come under another's control,
the title of the former is gone. Possession of the land therefore
is not necessarily possession of the gas. If an adjoining, or even
a distant, owner, drills his own land, and taps your gas, so that
it comes into his well and under his control, it is no longer yours,
but his."




drilling dissipates the gas pressure, because too many wells
are drilled, and many are improperly located, draining from
the gas rather than from the oil level.:4
The State's power to legislate for the protection of its
natural resources is based essentially upon its police power.
Constitutionality of oil and gas conservation statutes has
established the existence of two fundamental theories upon
which the State may justify its exercise of the police power in
this area: 1. By virtue of its interest in the protection of
its natural resources, the State may legislate to insure against
waste ;15 and 2. To insure ratable taking from a common res-
ervoir or pool, the State may legislate to regulate the correla-
tive rights of the common owners of the pool. 6 Certain con-
stitutional checks have been urged against the exercise of the
State's police power in oil and gas conservation. The most
important of these checks are deprivation of property with-
out due process of law, 7 denial of equal protection of the
laws,'8 impairment of the obligations of contract, 9 and inter-
ference with interstate commerce ;20 all of which have been
rejected.
Legislative regulation of drilling has proceeded slowly.
In a leading case, the United States Supreme Court in 1900
upheld an Indiana statute21 making it unlawful for a producer
to allow a well to flow freely for more than two days after
the striking of oil or gas. The statute was held to be a rea-
sonable exercise of the police power, in that it prevented
inequitable taking from a common source of supply, as well
14. For a general discussion of oil and gas conservation statutes, see
Ely, "The Conservation of Oil," (1938), 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1209;
Marshall and Meyers, "Legal Planning of Petroleum Production,"(1933) 42 Yale L.J. 702.
15. State v. Ohio Oil Co., 150 Ind. 21, 49 N.E. 809 (1898), aff'd, 177
U.S. 190 (1900).
16. Manufacturers Gas & Oil Co. v. Indiana Natural Gas Co., 156
Ind. 679, 59 N.E. 169 (1901).
17. Given v. State, 160 Ind. 552, 66 N.E. 750 (1903); Townsend v.
State, 147 Ind. 624, 47 N.E. 19 (1897).
18. Champlin Refining Co. v. Corp. Comm. of Oklahoma, 286 U.S. 210
(1932).
19. Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300 (1920).
20. Manufacturers Gas & Oil Co. v. Indiana Natural Gas Co., 156
Ind. 679, 59 N.E. 169 (1901); Corwin v. Indiana & Ohio Oil and
Gas Co., 120 Ind. 575, 22 N.E. 778 (1899); Consumers Gas Trust
Co. v. Harless, 131 Ind. 446, 29 N.E. 1062 (1892).
21. Ind, Acts 1893, c. 136, § 1, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 46-306.
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as waste of a natural resource.2 2 The constitutionality of the
same statute was again upheld 23 and still later was assumed. 24
Other statutes designed to prevent waste of oil and gas have
been upheld.25 The Oklahoma Well Spacing Act was more
recently upheld in Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. 25
There, the Corporation Commission of Oklahoma divided cer-
tain rural areas into ten-acre drilling units. Plaintiff owned
most of one unit, and the well for that unit was located
wholly on his land. The statute provided that each of the
various owners of tracts making up a drilling unit should
share in the oil royalties in the proportion that the acreage
of his tract bore to the total acreage of the drilling unit.
Plaintiff sought to recover all the royalty of oil produced from
the well, contending the statute violated the contract, due pro-
cess, and equal protection clauses of the federal constitution.
The Oklahoma Court held the statute valid as a reasonable
exercise of the police power. On appeal, the United States
Supreme Court held that no substantial federal question had
been raised, and the appeal, was dismissed for want of juris-
diction.2 7
Factually, there would seem to be little distinction be-
tween the plan upheld in Marrs v. City of Oxford28 and the
plans provided for by the Indiana Act. Under the plans used
in the Patterson and Marrs cases, a pool may have a number
of operators drilling small units. Under the Indiana Act, the
same result may be reached, since there is no requirement
that a drilling unit cover an entire pool,29 and since one oper-
ator is appointed by the Department of Conservation for each
drilling unit.30 In somewhat analogous situations involving
drainage and irrigation districts, similar plans have been
upheld .31
22. Supra, n. 15.
23. Given v. State, 160 Ind. 552, 66 N.E. 750 (1903).
24. McDonald v. Carlin, 163 Ind. 342, 71 N.E. 961 (1904).
25. See Note, 99 A.L.R. 1119 (1935).
26. Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 182 Old. 155, 77 P.(2d) 83
(1938).
27. Accord, Marrs v. City of Oxford, 24 F.(2d) 541 (D. Kan., 1928),
aff'd. 32 F.(2d) 134 (C.C.A. 8th, 1929), cert. denied 280 U.S. 573(1929).
28. Ibid.
29. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 277, §13-A.
30. Supra, n. 10.
31. Wurts v. Hoagland, 114 U.S. 606 (1885).
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Where unitization is brought about by a voluntary pool-
ing of interests, there can be little doubt as to its validity,
with the possible exception of a violation of anti-trust laws.
The Indiana Act provides that agreements approved by the
Department of Conservation shall not be construed to violate
state anti-trust laws.82 At best, however, the success of any
plan of voluntary unitization is contingent upon the coopera-
tion of all owners. Some statutory compulsion is required.
Perhaps, as has been suggested by authority, compulsory
unitization of whole fields or of whole pools is the best solu-
tion. 3 [At any rate, Indiana has taken a long step in the
right direction; and the constitutionality of the Indiana Act
seems not seriously in doubt, in the light of the Patterson
and Marrs cases.]
PROCEDURE
Introduction-The 1947 General Assembly followed its prede-
cessors in enacting several statutes in the field of judicial
procedure.1 Inasmuch as the validity of legislative activity
in this field is still an open question in Indiana,2 and since
either judicial or legislative superiority in rule making may
be rationally defended and supported by authority,3 no opin-
ion is expressed herein on the validity of the 1947 legislation
in the field of procedure on the grounds that it invades the
judicial function. The question of legislative power has been
re-examined by the Indiana Supreme Court in two recent
decisions.4 It would seem that the present court has declared
in its last pronouncement upon the subject that many so-
32. Ind. Acts 1947, c. 277, §13-A(e).
33. See German, "Compulsory Unit Operation of Oil Pools," (1931),
17 A.B. A.J. 393.
1. For a collection of statutes passed since the rule-making act of
1937, see 1 Gavit, "Ind. Pleading & Practice" (1941-5) §§ 3, 4, 12, 13.
2. No case has been found in which a legislative rule adopted since
1937 and a rule by the court have presented the square issue of
legislative or judicial superiority in this field.
3. See 1 Gavit, op. cit. supra n. 1, § 2-14 and cases cited; 1 Sutherland,
"Statutory Construction" (3rd ed., 1943) § 226; Wigmore, "All
Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure Are Void Constitutional-
ly" (1928) 23 Ill. L. Rev. 276; Notes, 110 A.L.R. 22 (1937), 158
A.L.R. 705 (1945).
4. Kostas v. Johnson, 69 N.E. (2d) 592 (Ind. 1946), (1947) 22 Ind.
L.J. 284; Square D. Co. v. O'Neal, 72 N.E. (2d) 654 (Ind. 1947).
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